Heuristic Play Through Equilibrium-Consistent Feedback
Abstract: Feedback in games has commonly been found to facilitate convergence to equilibrium play. However, few studies have examined whether such behavior reflects underlying equilibrium reasoning or the adoption of heuristics that yield equivalent choice outcomes. To investigate this, we designed a three stage experiment that tests the distraction effect—whether the presence of a plausible heuristic in a game interferes with the adoption of equilibrium reasoning. In the central learning stage, participants were assigned to one of two learning conditions: they played, with feedback, either a sequence of overlapping games—where equilibrium and a target heuristic prescribe the same action—or a sequence of distinct games—where the two prescribe different actions. Each game featured a computerized counterpart that consistently played the unique equilibrium action. We test the distraction effect across five widely studied heuristics, each used in turn as the target, in a 2 (learning conditions) × 5 (target heuristics) factorial design. Comparing the pre- and post-learning stages—where both game types were played without feedback—we find that the frequency of equilibrium choices increases similarly in both learning conditions. However, the underlying decision processes differ: for the same target heuristic, feedback on distinct games fosters reasoning consistent with equilibrium, whereas feedback on overlapping games reinforces the target heuristic. Notably, the magnitude of the distraction effect varies substantially across heuristics. These results underscore the need for caution when drawing inferences about decision mechanisms from choice data alone.